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JOHN DOES 1-30, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 870395-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Much of the information in Defendants1 Statement of Facts 
immaterial to the issues at hand. 
Specifically, pages 8 through 13 contain statements that, 
whether or not true, have no bearing on the question of whether 
the CAP Personnel Policies Manual was a contract and, if so, 
whether the contract has been breached. 
Some of the statements (such as those on pages 15 and 16), 
although basically true, are somewhat misleading when read out 
their context. For instance, Defendants state on p.16: "He 
[Gilmore] never requested a written decision of the Personnel 
Committee stating reasons for its decision." That may be true 
but the CAP Manual required written findings of the decision 
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so there was no reason for Gilmore to request them. The 
statement as presented by Defendants is misleading. 
Another example of a statement misleading out of context is 
on p.16 where Defendants state: "The decision of the [personnel] 
Committee was based on the evidence presented" (citing the Geter 
deposition, p.27). First, the Geter deposition doesn't say 
exactly that. Second, and most importantly, part of the evidence 
presented was presented after the last session of the so-called 
hearing; this was a letter from Schultz concerning Gilmore that 
Gilmore was unaware of, was not questioned about and had no 
opportunity to refute. Yet, according to committee member Roach, 
the committee based its decision primarily on it. See Facts #29 
and 30 of Plaintiff/Appellant*s Brief. 
No fact in Plaintiff/Appellant's Statement of Facts has been 
contradicted by Defendants. On appeal, the court must look at 
the facts and all fair inferences in a light most favorable to 
Gilmore, the party against whom summary judgment was entered. 
Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Rose v. 
Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (1986). 
SUMMARY OF REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Gilmore*s employment was not at will. The CAP 
Personnel Policies Manual did not prohibit the discharge of 
Gilmore but it did limit Defendants* right to discharge him by 
requiring that certain procedures be followed. 
A. Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979), 
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recognized two exceptions to an employer's right to fire at will: 
"an express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment or of good consideration in addition to the services 
rendered" (at 792). Bihlmaier should not be read to limit 
exceptions to the at-will doctrine to only those two situations. 
Other exceptions have been recognized; a company manual or 
handbook should also be recognized, not as a limitation 
prohibiting firings but rather as a limitation on the manner of 
firing according to whatever terms may be set out in the 
handbook. Bihlmaier did not involve any company handbooks or 
manuals so the question of whether handbooks or manuals would 
also limit the at-will doctrine was not addressed. (Plaintiff 
submits that a good consideration requirement would be met by 
Gilmore in any event; see D below and on page 14.) 
B. Utah has not rejected departures from the at-will 
doctrine based on employer policies and manuals. The cases cited 
by Defendants concern situations where company handbooks or 
manuals were not involved and/or where a limitation based on a 
handbook or manual was not claimed, discussed or argued and, 
therefore, not rejected. 
C. Gilmore does not claim that the CAP Manual 
constituted a contract as to duration of employment. The Manual 
was a contract as to procedures required for termination of 
employment and appeal. 
D. Even if good consideration in addition to services 
to be rendered is required in Utah for departure from the at-will 
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doctrine, the requirement is met. The CAP Manual provides that 
consideration. 
POINT II. Defendants did not substantially comply with CAP 
Manual procedures concerning either Gilmore's discharge or the 
appeal process. In light of the number of procedures that were 
violated and the manner in which they were violated, to claim 
substantial compliance is to stretch the imagination. 
POINT III. The individual defendants should be held liable for 
breach of contract. Their role was active, not passive. There 
is no reason for a corporate employer to shield them. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO POINT I. THE EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT A 
:
 ; TRADITIONAL AT-WILL RELATIONSHIP. 
A. The employment relationship was not at-will and without 
restrictions. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff Gilmore's employment was 
terminable at-will because the duration of employment was not 
specified and, under Bilhmaier v. Carson, supra, employment 
remains at-will without a specification of duration. 
In making this argument, Defendants (1) have failed to 
recognize the difference between an employment situation with no 
limitations on discharge as was involved in the Bihlmaier case 
and an employment situation with some limitations (such as 
procedures in a company handbook) as is involved in the Gilmore 
case and (2) are advocating a limiting and narrow application of 
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Bihlmaier that could not be intended and is not wise. 
In the Bihlmaier case, Bilhmaier had been deinied a loan 
because, in response to a request for information on the loan 
application, Carson, Bihlmaierfs employer, said Bihlmaier's 
employment was on a trial basis and that continued employment 
depended on Bihlmaier himself. Bihlmaier considered this 
statement and the refusal to change it as a constructive 
discharge so he quit his job and sued Carson for breach of an 
oral employment contract. Bihlmaier offered no specific basis 
for his claim that Carson had no right to fire him. The court 
said that unless there is some reason to limit the employer's 
right to fire (such as an agreement as to duration of employment 
or some other good consideration), the employer retains the right 
to fire at will. 
This is far different from Gilmore's situation. First, 
Gilmore has not said CAP had no right whatsoever to fire him, as 
Bihlmaier said. Plaintiff Gilmore is saying only that if he is 
fired, the procedures in the CAP Personnel Policies Manual must 
be followed and that he has a right to employment until 
procedures are complied with. The right to fire Gilmore existed 
but his discharge must comply with the Manual procedures. See 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 
1981). Second, in Bihlmaier, the court found no reason to limit 
the at-will doctrine. In the Gilmore case, the reason is the 
Defendants' Personnel Policies Manual. There was no manual or 
handbook in the Bihlmaier case so its effect on the at-will 
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doctrine was not at issue. 
To say that in Utah the strict rule under Bihlmaier is that 
an employer always has the right to fire employees at will unless 
there is an agreement concerning duration of employment or some 
good considertion in addition to services to be rendered would 
foreclose refief in situations where employers have fired 
classical at-will employees for most undesirable and improper 
reasons. To give Bihlmaier that strict and narrow reading, as 
Defendants advocate, ignores situations not invovled in and, 
therefore, neither argued or considered in the Bihlmaier case. 
Surely in Utah an employer would not be permitted to fire an 
employee for serving on a jury, for refusing to lie under oath 
about the employer's activities, for filing a worker's 
compensation claim, for refusing to participate in the employer's 
illegal activities. (These situations all led to court-
established exceptions to the at-will doctrine; see cases cited 
on p.28 of Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief.) Surely a Utah employer 
would not be permitted to shield himself in such situations with 
the Bihlmaier case by saying the employee was strictly at will 
because no term of employment was specified and no other 
consideration was rendered by the employee. That would be the 
result if Defendants' two-exceptions-only argurment is adopted. 
Likewise, Defendants in the instant case should not be 
permitted to promulgate a Manual with procedures for a proper 
discharge, tell Gilmore he is expected to follow it, violate the 
Manual when Gilmore is fired and then shield themselves with a 
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limiting, and somewhat incorrect, application of the Bihlmaier 
case. 
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mighigan, 292 
N.W. 2d 880 (Mich. 1980), the company had made the argurment, 
made by Defendants here, that restrictions in a company handbook 
could not limit the rite to fire when the duration of employment 
had not been specified. The Michigan Supreme Court specifically 
rejected the lower court's finding that "a contract of indefinite 
duration 'cannot be made other than terminable at will by a 
provision...'" in a handbook (at 890-891). The same argument 
should be rejected in Utah as was done in Michigan. 
B. The Utah appellate courts have not rejected departures from 
the at-will doctrine based on an employer's policies. 
Defendants claim (p.22 of their Brief) that Utah has firmly 
rejected departures from the at-will doctine based on an 
employer's policies. The two cases they cite, Bruno v. Plateau 
Mining Co., 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89 (1987), and Rose v. Allied 
Development Co., supra, do not support that position. 
In Rose, the court recognized that exceptions to the at-will 
doctrine do exist, citing Bihlmaier v. Carson, supra, as putting 
forth two exceptions (where duration of employment has been 
specified and where there is agreement for good consideration in 
addition to services to be rendered), and then found that Rose 
did not fall within either of the Bihlmaier exceptions. However, 
no written policies or procedures or employer handbooks of any 
kind were involved in the Bihlmaier or Rose cases and, therefore; 
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were not advocated as limitations on the employer's right to fire 
at will. Since they were not involved, argued or even discussed, 
it can hardly be said they were rejected as limitations on the 
right to fire at will. 
The plaintiff in Rose based his claimed employment contract 
on nothing more than two very brief oral conversations ("five 
minutes" and "a few sentences") with the defendant during which 
the minds obviously never met on the terms Rose claimed. 
In the recent Bruno case, written policies were involved but 
the plaintiff was not basing his claimed wrongful discharge on 
those written policies. In an interesting twist, he was trying 
to base his claim on what he said was a non-written practice 
directly opposite to the written policy. The defendant company 
had a written policy giving it the option to fire employees for 
fighting and plaintiff was indeed fired for fighting. Bruno said 
his discharge was wrongful because, despite that written policy, 
the company had an actual practice or de facto policy of not 
firing for fighting; Bruno claimed the practice was an implied 
contractural promise. The court ruled that even if such a de 
facto practice existed, "this practice alone is not enough to 
establish Plateau's intentional surrender of its right to 
terminate Bruno's employment at will." 
Applying this reasoning to the Gilmore case, one would ask: 
Did Defendants do something "to establish their intentional 
surrender of the right to terminate Gilmore's employment 
at-will?" The answer is yes: they promulgated a Personnel 
Policies Manual. They did not surrender the right to discharge 
Gilmore but they did surrender the right to discharge him unless 
the procedures in the Manual were complied with. 
The court in Bruno found a Bihlmaier exception had not been 
established and rejected an attempt to create an exception based 
on an unwritten de facto practice. Plaintiff Gilmore is not 
trying to establish a Bilhmaier exception or trying to establish 
a Bruno-type exception. Gilmore is trying to establish a 
limitation based on the written Manual. Such an exception was 
not addressed or considered in either Bihlmaier or Bruno. 
The court in Bruno further wrote: "An implied contract 
altering the employment-at-will relationship, like other 
contracts implied in fact, would require actions or conduct 
manifesting the mutual assent of both parties to be bound by the 
certain terms of their bargain" (at 90-91). Again applying this 
language to Gilmore, we find the promulgation of the Manual and 
the acceptance of it as evidence of mutual consent to be bound by 
the terms of the Manual. Gilmore was not free to accept or 
reject portions of the Manual he chose. The same standard must 
be mutually applied the the Defendants. 
Defendants attempt to get around Forrester v; Parker, 606 
p.2d 191 (N.M. 1980), a case directly and completley on point 
with the Gilmore case. Forrester, they accurately point out, 
required defendants (Parker and the local CAP) to conform to 
procedures for terminating Forrester as spelled out in the CAP 
manual because the manual created an implied contract and bound 
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the parties. But Defendants here argue that Rose rejected this 
departure from the at-will doctrine, holding that "'the existence 
of an employment agreement not terminable at-will must be 
established by more than subjective understandings or 
expectations'" (p.25 of their Brief). Forrester did not try and 
Gilmore is not trying to create departures from the at-will 
doctrine based on "subjective understandings or expectations." 
Forrester relied on and Gilmore is relying on a on detailed, 
written policy manual, something missing in Rose. 
Defendants cite Valentine v. General American Credit Inc., 
362 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1984), as (1) a clarification of the 
leading case in the field, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of Michigan, supra, and (2) a rejection of "Gilmore*s argument 
that a personnel policy manual creates a new employment right" 
(pp. 25, 26 of their Brief). To that we respond: Valentine 
specifically reaffirms the Toussaint holding that company manuals 
may be enforceable in contract. The case does point out that 
Touissaint did not "recognize employment as a fundamental right 
or create a new 'special' right," as the plaintiff in Valentine 
was trying to do. But Gilmore has never claimed that he has a 
fundamental right to employment or that he has some "special" 
right to his job. His only claim is a right to be terminated 
properly in accordance with the procedures in the CAP Manual. He 
seeks to enforce the Personnel Policies Manual as a contract, a 
right recognized in Toussaint and reaffirmed in Valentine. 
Defendants claim (p.26 of their Brief) that a majority of 
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the states which have considered the question have determined 
that a policy manual does not implicitly limit the right of an 
employer to terminate at will. In the cases cited, a look at the 
reasons for the rejection of company policies as a limitation in 
those cases shows them to be inapplicable to the instant case. 
For instance: 
* Reid v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 
1986): Plaintiffs claimed they were wrongfully discharged because 
the employee handbook's listing of causes that could result in 
termination limited the company's right to fire. The court 
pointed out that an employer can defeat such claims by requiring 
prospective employees to acknowledge that they serve as at-will 
employees. Sears had included that exact language in its 
employment application, indicating clearly that the employee 
handbook was not to be a contract. No such language is involved 
in the Gilmore case; hence, Reid is inapplicable. 
*Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 
779 (1976): The court here refused to construe the employee 
handbook as a contract because it was a "unilateral expression of 
company policy and procedures" and was "not published until long 
after plaintiff's employment." Neither description is applicable 
in the Gilmore case. 
Schroeder v. Dayton-Hundson Corp., 448 F.Supp. 910 (E.D. 
Mich. 1977): The court looked at the employee handbook as 
something designed to inform the employee about fringe benefits, 
privileges and certain policies. The significant factor to 
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consider here, however, is that this was a federal district court 
applying Michigan law to state common law claims prior to the 
time the Michigan Supreme Court decided Toussaint. 
Heideck v. Kent General Hospital Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 
1982): The court described the handbook here as a "unilateral 
expression" that was "issued for guidance...of employees." The 
court also noted that the handbook had been complied with. 
Defendants have ignored the trend and the long line of cases 
recognizing company handbooks and manuals and contractually 
enforceable. In addition to cases already cited in 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief, handbooks and manuals have been 
found enforceable as contracts in: 
Mobil Coal Producing Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 
1985); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo, 
1986); Continental Air Lines Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 
1987); Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1985). 
C. No claim is made that the CAP Manual constituted a contract 
as to duration of employment. 
Defendants argue (p. 26 of their Brief) that under Utah lav; 
an employer's policies do not constitute an express or implied 
contract as to the duration of employment. Plaintiff Gilmore has 
not argued that the CAP Manual was a contract concerning duration 
of employment. Gilmore has not argued that the Manual gave him a 
right to lifetime employment or to employment for a specified 
length of time. He argues that the Manual gave him a right to be 
terminated properly, in accordance with procedures spelled out in 
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the CAP Manual. 
Defendants misleadingly state that Gilmore "was employed six 
months before he obtained a copy of the policies" (p.27), a fact 
that may or may not be true but in either case is immaterial. 
Plaintiff Gilmore was originally hired on a temporary basis and 
worked on that basis for six months. So whether he had a copy of 
the Manual during that period is not material as the policies did 
not necessarily apply to him in the termporary position (or at 
least, that question is not at issue here). But at the time 
Plaintiff Gilmore became a permanent employee, he had a copy and 
was told he was expected to follow the policies laid out in the 
Manual. 
Defendants then argue that Moore v. Utah Technical College, 
727 P.2d 634 (Utah 1986), and Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State 
College, supra, are cases that fall within the Bihlmaier 
exception (concerning length of employment) to the at-will 
doctrine because both cases involve one-year contracts of 
employment. Defendants describe the cases as "excellent examples 
of the employment at-will doctrine, demonstrating the 
circumstances under which the first exception to the doctrine 
applies" (p.29 of their Brief). Such a statement actually 
indicates a lack of understanding of both the Bihlmaier exception 
and the two cases. 
^
e
 Bihlmaier exception concerning duration of employment 
involves the situation where an employee has a contract or 
agreement (express or implied) to work for a certain period of 
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time. If the employee is fired during that period, he would have 
a cause of action for being wrongfully terminated as the contract 
prevents his being fired during the time specified. In Moore and 
Piacitelli, a series of one-year contract periods had expired. 
The employers decided not to continue the employment of Moore and 
Piacitelli and so notified them. The question in both cases was 
not whether the employees (Moore and Piacitelli) had been 
terminated wrongfully during the period of employment specified 
in the contracts. Rather the question was whether they had been 
properly terminated in accordance with procedures detailed in the 
employer policy manuals. In both cases, the employers were 
required to comply with the manual procedures. If anything, a 
requirement of compliance with the CAP Manual should be stronger 
in the Gilmore case. In Moore and Piacitelli, the duration of 
employment had ended under the terms of the contract but 
compliance with handbook procedures was still mandated. 
It is correct, as Defendants point out on p.29 of their 
Brief and as is pointed out on p.24 of Plaintiff/Appellant's 
Brief, that the Utah Supreme Court was not asked in Piacitelli to 
actually decide whether the personnel manual was a contract as 
that question had been decided in the affirmative by the Fifth 
District Court and was not appealed. But in its opinion, the 
court noted such and referred to the lower court's ruling with 
approval. (Piacitelli at 1065-1066.) 
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D. The CAP Manual was good consideration in addition to services 
to be rendered. "" 
Defendants argue (p.29 of their Brief) that Gilmore did not 
provide any good consideration in addition to the services to be 
rendered and, therefore, the second Bihlmaier-recognized 
exception to the at-will doctrine cannot be found. Even if the 
court were to rule that the two Bihlmaier exceptions to the 
at-will doctrine are the only exceptions that will be recognized 
in Utah, Plaintiff Gilmore's discharge is still improper on the 
grounds that the second Bihlmaier exception is present. The 
"express or implied ...good consideration in addition to the 
services contracted to be rendered" (Bihlmaier at 792) is 
provided by the CAP Personnel Policies Manual. 
In Leithead v. American Colloid, supra, the lower court had 
held that the company handbook was not part of the employee's 
contract because it was "not supported by consideration running 
from appellant [employee] to the company. The Wyoming Supreme 
Court rejected this "rule of additional consideration relied on 
by the district court," ruling: 
The benefits extended to the employee in 
the handbook are enforceable contract terms, 
because they are supported by consideration 
flowing to the employer. That consideration 
consists of the benefit of an orderly, 
cooperative and loyal work force. (At 1063 
and citing Mobil Coal Producing Inc. v. 
Parks, supra.) 
-15-
In the Mobil case, the court had written: 
The handbook *s provisions change the 
appellant's [company's] unfettered right to 
discharge appellee [employee]...provisions 
[in the handbook] create an expectation on 
the part of an employee that they will be 
followed, and they induce appellee to 
continue his employment with appellant. 
Appellant 'secures an orderly, coopertive and 
loyal work force'...Benefit to the promisor 
is sufficient consideration for a contract. 
(At 707.) 
The source of this reasoning was the Michigan Supreme Court, 
which had said in Toussaint: 
While an employer need not establish 
personnel policies or practices, where an 
employer chooses to establish such policies 
and practices and makes them known to its 
employees, the employment relationship is 
presumably enhanced. The employer secures an 
orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, 
and the employee the peace of mind associated 
with job security and the conviction that he 
will be treated fairly. No pre-employment 
negotiations need take place and the parties' 
minds need not meet on the subject; nor does 
it matter that the employee knew nothing of 
the particulars of the employer's policies 
and practices or that the employer may change 
them unilaterally. It is enough that the 
employer chooses, presumably in its own 
interest, to create an environment in whcih 
the employee believes that, whatever the 
personnel policies and practices, they are 
established and official at any given time, 
purport to be fair, and are applied 
consistently and uniformly to each employee. 
The employer has then created a situtation 
"instinct with an obligation." (At 892; 
footnotes omitted.) 
In light of the foregoing, the court should find that if the 
Bihlmaier case requires good consideration in order to depart 
from the at-will doctrine, then that requirement is satisfied by 
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a written policy manual promlgated by the employer and relied on 
by the employee. 
REPLY TO POINT II, DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUBSTANTIALY COMPLY 
WITH THE CAP PERSONNEL POLICIES MANUAL. 
A. Defendants did not substantially compny with the CAP 
Personnel Policies Manual in discharging Gilmore. 
Defendants' argument (Point II, p.31, of their Brief) that 
CAP substantially complied with the Personnel Policies Manual is 
simply not born out by the uncontested facts. In Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's Brief, all violations of the CAP Manual are 
delineated in the Statement of Facts, specifically Facts #17 
through 22, 26, 31, 32, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43. None of these facts 
have been denied by Defendants. 
Defendants ignore the investigation by the Community 
Services Administration, a grantor agency of CAP, which 
determined that CAP had violated the CAP Personnel Policies 
Manual and then sanctioned CAP with a cut in funds (all of which 
is uncontested by Defendants). Apparently CSA saw no 
"substantial compliance." 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, supra, approves 
of substantial compliance only where the purposes of the 
procedural requirements are fulfilled and the substantial 
interests of the parties are satisfied (at 1066). In Piacitelli, 
the College's handbook contained considerable detail about the 
purposes of various procedures (at 1066) and the court looked at 
those stated purposes in determining whether the actions taken by 
the employer were in substantial compliance. The CAP Personnel 
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Policies Manual, however, is largely silent as to the purposes of 
its various procedural requirements. Defendants have taken it 
upon themselves to speculate on what the purposes of the 
uncomplied-with procedures might be and then conclude that the 
purposes they have supplied have been met. Such speculative 
additions after the fact should not be permitted. 
Defendants also try to show substantial compliance by simply 
talking in circles. Defendants spend three pages (pp.33, 34, 38) 
expounding on discussions Defendant Schultz had with Plaintiff 
Gilmore about alleged problems with his (Gilmore's) work 
performance, then point out that Gilmore was reduced in force, 
not discharged for poor job performance. Even assuming that such 
discussions took place as Defendants claim, it makes no sense to 
say that discussions about his job performance were supposed to 
give Gilmore some idea that he would be reduced in force. Taking 
into consideration his periodic raises in pay and the one job 
evaluation, which although never completed, gave Gilmore 
excellant and above average ratings, Gilmore certainly had no 
reason to believe he was about to be discharged, either because 
of a reduction in force or for poor job performance. 
Nor was the Manual's requirement of periodic job performance 
evaluations ever substantially complied with in any manner that 
could possibly put Gilmore on notice that his job was in 
jeopardy. The one uncompleted evaluation did just the opposite. 
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B. Defendants did not substantially comply with the CAP 
Personnel Policies Manual in hearing Gilmore's appeal. 
Defendants state (p.39 of their Brief) that CAP's appeal 
procedure was adopted to provide for prompt and fair consider-
ation of personnel actions. Again Defendants have speculated on 
a purpose where none is stated in the Manaul. But even if that 
is accepted as the purpose, the manner of handling Gilmore's 
appeal cannot be described with the terms prompt and fair. 
The Manual entitled Gilmore to an appeal before Schultz. 
Schultz claimed a meeting he had with Gilmore before the firing 
was an appeal of the firing. It can hardly be said that Schultz 
substantially complied with the Manual by calling a meeting held 
before the firing an appeal hearing on the firing. [Note: 
Defendants state on p.44 that within four or five days after 
Schultz notified Gilmore of the decision to teminate him, Gilmore 
was afforded a full hearing. This simply is not true, as 
evidenced by uncontested facts. Schultz in his March 16 letter 
to Gilmore (Exhibit D-13 to the Gilmore depositon and Addendum-4 
of Plaintiff/Appellant*s Brief) said he considered a meeting he 
had with Gilmore the previous week to be an appeal of the March 
14 termination. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants have ever, in 
the lower court or in the statements of facts on appeal, stated 
that Schultz afforded Gilmore a full hearing before him after the 
firing.] 
The appeal hearing before the CAP personnel committee was 
full of flaws: only two of five committee members present at the 
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first session of the so-called hearing and only three of five 
members present at the second session; no opportunity for Gilmore 
to know and refute what Schultz told the committee members, a 
decision based primarily on information in a letter unknown to 
Gilmore and given to the committee after the conclusion of the 
hearing, a decision issued three weeks after the hearing and not 
within five days as required, no written findings. (These flaws 
are detailed in Facts #20 through 35 of Plaintiff/Appellant *s 
Brief.) It stretches the imagination to describe the Defendants' 
actions concerning the appeal process as "substantially in 
compliance." 
Defendants argue (p.39 of their Brief) that "Gilmore 
believes he was not afforded a fair hearing because it was not a 
trial type or formal hearing." Gilmore has made no such claim. 
He has merely asked that the hearing and appeal process be fair 
and comply with the Manual rules. 
The cases Defendants cite on pp.39 and 40 of their Brief are 
civil rights cases and a case involving a license revocation 
hearing. Those cases did not involve any company policy manuals. 
Their holdings in the due process area have limited application 
to company policy manual cases where enforcement is not sought on 
civil rights grounds. 
Defendants state (p.42 of their Brief) that "Gilmore never 
requested the formal procedures he now claims should have been 
provided." First, Gilmore claims only that the procedures 
required by the Manual must be followed. Second, a reading of 
the pages of Gilmore's deposition referred to by Defendants (on 
pp.42 and 43 of their Brief) shows that Gilmore never waived any 
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rights. His testimony shows only that he never had an 
opportunity to request what Defendants now claim he waived. 
REPLY TO POINT III. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE 
LIABLE FOR THEIR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
Defendants argue (Point III, p.45) that summary judgment 
dismissing claims against CAP officers and employees (Schultz, 
Geter, Fields, Philbrick, O'Connell) is proper because these 
individual defendants are not personally liable for a breach of 
contract with Plaintiff Gilmore. 
Moniodis v. Cook, 494 A.2d 212 (Md.App. 1985), directly 
addressed the question of whether an officer or employee of a 
corporation can be sued individually and held liable for the 
wrongful discharge of an employee. The court ruled: 
This is not to say that an "officer of a 
corporation or other business entity who 
plays a dominant role in the affairs of the 
corporate employer and who primarily 
formulates the corporation's decision to fire 
a particular employee or group of employees 
should be permitted to take refuge behind the 
corporate veil in order to insulate himself 
from liability for his own wrongful conduct. (At 218.) 
Applying that criteria to the defendants in that case, the 
court found no individual liability because those defendants had 
played no key roles, had many officers senior to them with veto 
power over their actions, had little or no policy-making 
authority. 
The situation is far different in the Gilmore case and 
applying the Moniodis criteria would lead to a finding of 
personal liability. Schultz was the executive director with 
responsibility for day-to-day operations and authority for all 
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personnel decisions, including initial appeals of his personnel 
decisions. Richard Fields was the personnel administrator, whose 
duties included, among others, seeing that employee evaluations 
were done in accordance with the CAP Personnel Policies Manual 
(see Manual). Fred Geter was chairman of the personnel commitee, 
which was responsible for hearing appeals in accordance with CAP 
personnel policies (see Manual). Robert Philbrick and Ann 
O'Connell were presidents of the CAP board of trustees, both of 
whom Gilmore complained to concerning the lack of adherence to 
the Manual procedures and neither of whom took any action to 
correct the situation. 
The court in Moniodis also pointed out that its previous 
decisions had not been intended to provide a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge against corporate officials, "at least where 
the evidence does not show that the officer was clothed with the 
essential attributes of an employer" (at 218). Certainly the 
individual defendants in the Gilmore case were well clothed with 
the "essential attributes of an employer" and should not ask the 
corporation to shield them from their own personal actions. 
One of two cases Defendants cite (on p.45 of their Brief) to 
support their contention that the individual Defendants should 
not be personally liable, Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal.App.2d 714, 
64 Cal.Rptr. 404 (1967), actually holds the opposite, reaching 
the conclusion that corporate officials, not only the 
corporation, may be held personally liable. Mr. Golden had sued 
four corporate defendants and nine employees as individuals for 
intentional interference with a contract; as to three of the 
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individual defendants, the court ruled that even though they had 
acted for the corporation in a representative capacity and within 
the course and scope of their employment, they were not immune 
from liability as individuals. The lower court's summary 
judgment in their favor was reversed. Summary judgment was 
upheld in favor of six other individual defendants but only 
because the facts showed that they had absolutely no knowledge of 
any contract and, therefore, could not have done anything to 
interfere. Similar to Moniodis, the question turned on whether 
the individuals were active participants. And an application of 
that reasoning to the instant case would preclude summary 
judgment against the individual defendants, all of whom were 
active participants. 
The other case Defendants cite in support of their 
contention, Wise v. Southern Pacific Co.,223 Cal.App.2d 50, 
35 Cal.Rptr. 659 (1953), concerned a suit against fellow 
employees for conspiracy to obtain the plaintiff's discharge. The 
court's holding that employees of a corporation cannot be found 
to have conspired with the corporation has no applicability in 
the Gilmore case. Plaintiff Gilmore does not seek liability 
based on conspiracy. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Gilmore has replied to each argument Defendants 
have made in support of the lower court's summary judgment in 
their favor and has demonstrated why such agruments are incorrect 
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or inapplicable and should be rejected. It should also be noted 
that Defendants made no response to the estoppel argument made by 
Plaintiff Gilmore in Point II of the Plaintiff/Appellant•s Brief. 
In this light and in light of all materials before the 
court, Plaintiff Gilmore respectfully submits that he should be 
granted the relief sought as stated in his Brief together with an 
award of his costs, pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah Ct. App. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on April 12, 1988: 
Nann Nov insk i -Durando 
Attorney for Plaint iff /Appellant 
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